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Abstract 
 
This article examines Sino-Korean cultural relations in the 1920s and 1930s, focusing on 
representations of Korean anticolonial activist An Chunggŭn’s assassination of Japanese prime 
minister Itō Hirobumi (1909). Two different junctures in particular are considered: the release of 
the film Patriotic Spirit by Chŏng Kitak in 1928 and the Wanbaoshan Incident in 1931. Patriotic 
Spirit, a transnational dramatization of An’s story, was the first Chinese film directed by a 
Korean; the Wanbaoshan Incident was a violent conflict between Chinese and Koreans caused 
by the unofficial “discord-provoking policy” of the Japanese empire. The article tracks changes 
in Chinese responses to An’s story before and after these two junctures, showing that Patriotic 
Spirit subtly communicated transnationalism while also catering to the Sinocentric taste of 
Chinese audiences. It also examines how Chinese print media in 1928 appropriated Patriotic 
Spirit for nationalist ends. Following the Wanbaoshan Incident, An’s story resurfaced in China. 
Despite heightened anti-Korean sentiment in China at this time, An avoided Chinese 
condemnation because the Chinese unwittingly categorized him as Korean yet not Korean. 
Hence, while An’s story became integrated into Chinese discourse, this study reveals, the sign of 
An Chunggŭn caused a rupture in the Han/non-Han divide embedded in Republican-era Chinese 
nationalism. 
 
Keywords: An Chunggŭn, Chŏng Kitak, Patriotic Spirit, Wanbaoshan Incident, Republican 
Chinese film, nationalism, Sinocentrism, colonial transnationalism, Sino-Korean cultural 
relations 
 
 
On October 26, 1909, when Korea was a protectorate state of Japan, Korean anticolonial activist 
An Chunggŭn (1879–1910) assassinated Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909), the former Japanese prime 
minister and first resident-general of Korea, at the Harbin train station in northeast China. Itō had 
traveled to Harbin for a meeting with Vladimir Kokovtsov, the Russian secretary of the treasury 
in Manchuria; after An shot Itō to death, An was immediately arrested by the Russian police 
guarding Kokovtsov and later handed over to the Japanese police. An was incarcerated in the 
Lüshun prison in the Kwantung Leased Territory, sentenced to death on February 14, 1910, and 
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executed on March 26, 1910.1 Despite An’s nationality and the context of this incident, his story 
was repeatedly recounted, dramatized, and memorialized by the Chinese in literature, criticism, 
biographies, and journalism throughout the Republican period (1912–1949).2 In 1928, Patriotic 
Spirit (C: Aiguohun)—a film directed in Shanghai by Korean filmmaker Chŏng Kitak—injected 
for the first time a Korean perspective into existing Chinese nationalist narratives about An. In 
1931, the Wanbaoshan Incident, a violent conflict between Korean and Chinese civilians in 
Manchuria and Korea, led to yet another shift in An’s legacy in China. This article examines how 
An Chunggŭn served as a symbol communicating different meanings in Chinese discourse at 
these two junctures in terms of Sino-Korean relations and Chinese nationalism. 
From 1909 to 1939, sixty-eight articles in Chinese-language periodicals, excluding 
newspapers, discussed An Chunggŭn. Except for 1909 and 1910, when the actual event and 
execution took place, there were only two years in which six or more articles about An were 
published: 1913 and 1931.3 Daily papers, by comparison, reported more steadily on An and his 
family, including stories about the financial situation of An’s bereaved family, who moved to 
Shanghai following his death; the death of An’s mother; the college education of An’s daughter; 
and the careers of An’s brothers. However, newspapers showed a similar pattern— more articles 
were published in 1909, 1910, and 1931—with one exception: there were heated discussions in 
newspapers in 1928 about the film Patriotic Spirit, which was an immense hit in Shanghai.4 
Since the 1910s, then, the most attention was given to An, through reporting and dramatizations, 
in 1928 and 1931. By connecting these junctures and comparing the use of An as a symbol in 
Chinese discourse, this study shows how Chŏng’s historical-political drama film (1928) and the 
violent Sino-Korean conflict (1931) unwittingly reinforced nationalism yet caused a rupture in 
Chinese nationalism, a finding that casts light on the new aspects of the colonial-to-colonial 
cultural interactions in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Tracking Chinese print media’s recollections of An, I found striking contrasts in Chinese 
responses to the 1909 historical incident and to the 1928 film dramatization of that event. 
Immediately after the incident, Chinese audiences praised An as a “patriotic Korean martyr,” 
whereas later, Chinese discourse obscured An’s Korean nationality, privileging either the story 
of an individual’s sacrifice for the nation or formalistic aspects of Chŏng’s film. In the 1930s, 
Chinese discourse about An changed again and expressed even greater admiration of An, despite 
heightened anti-Korean sentiment in China due to the 1931 Wanbaoshan Incident. This article 
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investigates critical implications of these contradictions in the Sino-Korean cultural interaction 
during the Japanese colonial era. More specifically, my analysis shows what diasporic Koreans 
were able to do, other than collaborate or resist, in semicolonized China, where ethnonationalism 
powerfully appropriated transnational voices.  
Later in the article, I elaborate on the complicated relations between nationalism and 
transnationalism in Republican China, the context in which Patriotic Spirit was situated. Put 
briefly, in China both nationalism and transnationalism emerged at the turn of the twentieth 
century, feeding and competing with each other. As previous studies have demonstrated, Chinese 
transnationalism of this period ranged from state transnationalism—as seen in Sun Yat-sen’s 
Pan-Asianism and his rhetorical slogan of the Republic of the Five Races—to the popular 
transnationalism of religious orientation, exemplified in Kang Youwei’s Great Unity (C: Datong) 
philosophy. Although Chinese nationalism was never self-sufficient and hinged on 
transnationalism, Sinocentric nationalism co-opted and contained transnational ethics and 
movements at crucial political junctures (Duara 1998). Whereas previous studies have 
illuminated two sides of nationalist appropriation of transnationalism—nationalism that 
dominates transnationalism yet lacks self-sufficiency—this article reveals a self-rupturing aspect 
of that appropriating process.  
Among existing narratives about An, Patriotic Spirit offers an excellent opportunity to 
examine the ways in which Chinese nationalism, embodied in the responses of Chinese 
audiences and critics to the film, powerfully yet incompletely eclipsed An’s transnationalist 
intentions and vision. Based on the true story of An’s assassination of Itō Hirobumi, Patriotic 
Spirit was the first Chinese film directed by a Korean filmmaker and also Chŏng Kitak (1905–
1937)’s directorial debut. The success of Patriotic Spirit brought Chŏng significant fame in 
China. Patriotic Spirit recast An’s true story as a narrative about a Sino-Korean alliance against 
Japanese colonialism. I show that Patriotic Spirit’s transnational voice, which echoes An 
Chunggŭn’s vision of Asian solidarity, initially generated an unintended nationalist response 
from its audience, yet ultimately brought about a rupture in ethnonationalism at a most unlikely 
moment—following the 1931 Wanbaoshan Incident, when more than a hundred Chinese and 
Koreans were killed.  
To demonstrate that process, the article is divided into four parts. The first part of this 
article lays out the political-historical context of An’s activism and examines Chinese nationalist 
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responses to An’s story prior to Patriotic Spirit. The second part discusses Patriotic Spirit and its 
transnationalism. The third part analyzes the unintended nationalist responses of Chinese 
audiences to the film’s depiction of the story. Finally, the last part looks at later responses of the 
Chinese to An’s story in light of anti-Korean sentiments following the Wanbaoshan Incident, 
showing how the seemingly coherent and cohesive mechanism of Chinese nationalism ruptured. 
This study argues that 1930s Chinese media inadvertently echoed the transnationalism of An and 
Patriotic Spirit, despite the predominant anti-Korean sentiment following the Wanbaoshan 
Incident. By attending to Sino-Korean cultural relation in film and print media, I reveal a 
deconstructive, decentered element within 1920s and 1930s nationalist discourses. Rather than 
tracking how East Asian nationalisms emerged, developed, and crystallized in the wake of 
Western and Japanese colonialism, I uncover the incoherent and noncohesive aspects of East 
Asian nationalism at the time. Hence, this study sheds light on two aspects of ethnonationalism: 
(1) its exclusionary attribute, which subjugates other nations within and beyond its territory; and 
(2) the self-rupturing moment of Han-centric nationalism in which it simultaneously excludes 
and includes another nation.  
 
A Treatise on Peace in the East (1910) and Chinese Responses to An’s Story Prior to 1928 
Although An’s assassination of a prominent Japanese politician has typically been 
viewed as an expression of Korean nationalism, his act was based on a vision of Asian unity that 
challenged ethnonationalism. At his trial, An Chunggŭn stated that in 1905 he encountered the 
Japanese emperor’s statement that Japan was waging a war against Russia “to protect peace in 
the East [J: Tōyō no heiwa 東洋の平和] and the independence of Korea [from Russian invasion]” 
(Ichikawa 1979, 143). As the only Asian country among the world empires, Japan claimed the 
role of defending Asia from invasion by Western empires, propagating the slogan “peace in the 
East” that the Japanese emperor and politicians had conveniently employed, since the 1895 Sino-
Japanese war, to legitimate colonial invasion. An took literally the emperor’s rhetorical call for 
peace in the East, concluding that it was Itō Hirobumi who rescinded the military sovereignty of 
Korea, schemed to occupy Manchuria, and therefore interfered with the emperor’s political 
vision. Hence, An argued that killing Itō was a means of maintaining the regional peace, 
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inadvertently appropriating the imperialist rhetoric of Eastern peace for a theoretical ground of 
anticolonial practices. 
The Japanese imperialist version of Eastern peace was a concept familiar to people across 
East Asia in the early twentieth century. However, it is difficult to assess how widely An’s own 
idea of Eastern peace was known in China at the time of his death. A couple of Chinese-language 
articles touched on An’s political philosophy. In a short piece in National News Weekly (C: 
Guowen zhoubao), for example, Lü Bo noted, “A person who observed the execution of An 
quotes [An's last words]: ‘I’m leaving [this world]. I plead all of you to strive for peace in East 
Asia’” (1925, 17), thus informing his Chinese readers of An’s call for the communal East Asian 
pursuit of peace. 
 
Figure 1. Hearing record. Source: Kukka Pohunch’ŏ (1995, 621). Originally a thirteen-page 
classified document of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
In An’s unfinished book, A Treatise on Peace in the East (K: Dong’yang p’yunghwa lon), 
which he wrote in prison and which was published posthumously, An condemned the schism 
within the East, especially Japan’s war against China, stressing the necessity of racial solidarity 
among Asian nations in order to resist Western empires. Although that book is too short to 
adequately present An’s specific political vision, the “hearing record” (K: ch’ŏngch’uisŏ) from 
his one-on-one talk with District Judge Hiraishi Ujihito soon after his 1910 trial (see figure 1) 
reveals his idea of an ideal regional community and a more detailed picture of regional peace. An 
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called on Korea, China, and Japan to establish a Peace Council of the East (K: Dong’yang 
Pyŏnghwa Ŭihoe 東洋平和會議), a joint “peace army” in which soldiers should speak at least 
two languages, and also joint banks in Lüshun and other major cities in the three countries. In 
addition, An argued that China, Korea, and Japan should share a single currency, and that Japan 
ought to guide Korea’s and China’s economic development. Finally, An urged Japan to make an 
official apology to Korea and China for its military invasions (Kukka Pohunch’ŏ 1995, 621–
633).5  
Chinese cultural responses to An’s assassination of Itō trace back to 1911, when the 
Evolution Group (C: Jinhuatuan), a troupe dedicated to modernizing Chinese drama, staged the 
play An Chunggŭn Assassinates Itō (C: An Chonggen ci Yiteng). Deng Yingchao—the wife of 
Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) who was one of the core members of the Chinese Communist Party—
played a role in the production. Without a surviving script, it is impossible to analyze how the 
play actually presented An’s actions, but newspaper sources nonetheless indicate that between 
1911 and 1928, Chinese playwrights and actors dramatized and revived An’s story as a means of 
bolstering Chinese nationalism. In the 1920s, An Chunggŭn Assassinates Itō continued to be 
performed not only in Shanghai but in other cities across China, a nationwide staging that 
demonstrates the popular circulation of An’s story in China. As Chang’s study notes, plays 
dramatizing An’s act were performed in Zhenhai (Zhejiang Province), Haifeng, Tianjin, Wuhan, 
Changsha, and Guangzhou, among others. Prominent figures of the time, such as Peng Pai, Zhou 
Enlai, Deng Yingchao, and Tian Han, participated in these plays as directors or actors. The 
literary group Southern Society (C: Nanshe) enthusiastically put on plays about An from the 
1910s to 1923 (Chang 2010). On April 21, 1924, a Shanghai News (C: Shenbao) article reported, 
“The play An Chunggŭn became a hot issue among people. When An Chunggŭn gets arrested 
after killing Itō, he shouts out one phrase. The audience’s heart will ache upon hearing it,” 
suggesting that viewers would sympathize with An’s political intention. On May 8, 1925, the 
newspaper reported that the Youth Propaganda Group (C: shaonian xuanjiang tuan) would 
perform An Assassinates Itō the following evening. An’s story apparently attracted Chinese 
authors and audiences not only because the event had taken place in Harbin and had been widely 
reported on by the Chinese media, but also because the semicolonized Chinese partially shared 
Koreans’ enmity toward the Japanese empire. 
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On the other hand, a Shanghai News article on March 6, 1924, “Lecture Report” (C: 
yanjiang xinji), suggests that Chinese interest in An’s anticolonial story reflected Sinocentrism 
and a nostalgia for the Chinese empire. From the tenth century until China’s defeat in the 1895 
Sino-Japanese War, Korea had been a tributary state of the Chinese empire, and Chinese 
intellectuals, both conservative and progressive, viewed Korea as territory that the Japanese 
empire had usurped from China. The Shanghai News article reported on a speech that An 
Xiansheng, the daughter of An Chunggŭn, had been invited to give at a school to commemorate 
An Chunggŭn as a “national martyr ” (C: lieshi). “After her talk,” according to the reporter, “the 
principal Zhao said that the [national] culture of Korea belongs to the Chinese culture” and that 
the nationalist idea of sacrificing oneself for national salvation actually originated in Chinese 
culture:  
The principal said that Chinese culture inspired the martyr An with the sense of 
political justice and loyalty to the nation. “I consider that everywhere in Southeast 
Asia and also all over the world, there is no place on which Chinese culture failed 
to have influence. The development of the entire Western civilization, for 
example, depended on Chinese sailing techniques. A compass that people use for 
sailing was the invention of one of the Chinese emperors. Japanese culture is also 
Chinese culture that Japan directly obtained through Korea…. I want to assure all 
of you that developing Chinese culture is the only way to save [China].” 
 
Zhao’s speech here echoes the Sinocentric stance of Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the 
Republic of China, on the relationship between China and other Asian countries. In assessing the 
significance of the incident, Zhao not only privileges devotion to the nation, thereby obscuring 
An’s anticolonial achievement, but also, in order to claim Chinese influence on An, conflates 
modern nationalism with the premodern virtue of loyalty to a monarch. Rather than perceiving 
other Asian nations as allies of equal status, both Sun Yat-sen and the principal evoked a past in 
which the Chinese empire subjugated other Asian nations. This example epitomizes how the 
Chinese hailed An, a foreigner activist, yet also employed his achievement to celebrate the 
Chinese cultural legacy, refuting the assumption of previous studies that linked fervent Chinese 
praise of An with China’s appreciation of Korea as a political partner (Yi 1995; An 2001; Sin 
2009; Yun 2011a). As Harrison (2001) has shown, whereas the Han nation sought independence 
from Western and Japanese empires in the Republican era, it maintained its own imperial 
relationship to other Asian nations (Harrison 2001). 
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  Transnationalism was also present in both state and popular sectors, despite the hegemony 
of Sinocentric nationalism (Han-nationalism) in the 1920s. As much as Sun Yat-sen endorsed the 
“Sino-Barbarian dichotomy” (C: huayizhibian 華夷之辨), he also strategically employed the 
transnational ideology of “all-embracing unity” (C: dayitong 大一統 ), emphasizing Pan-
Asianism internationally and the Republic of the Five Races domestically. Sun Yat-sen’s Pan-
Asianism foregrounded the same race—the “yellow” race as opposed to the white—common 
culture, and cultural resistance against Western empires in order to appeal to people across Asia, 
including Japan. The Nationalist government strategically appropriated a “dualistic, redemptive 
modernity” by licensing certain transnational elements from religious groups built on Buddhist 
and/or Confucian universalism to endorse the Chinese version of the modern world, different 
from that of Western imperialists (Duara 1998, 653). Ultimately, however, Sinocentrism and 
imperialism vis-à-vis other Asian nations overshadowed transnational thoughts and practices at 
critical political junctures in 1920s and 1930s China (Yokoyama 2009). 
In 1927, the KMT and other civilian nationalist groups also employed the Chinese play 
based on An’s story in order to promote projects for building a unified, independent modern 
nation, which required ending the Warlord Era (1916–1928) and reclaiming economic 
sovereignty from the Japanese empire. These Chinese dramatizations framed An’s story within a 
nationalist context, obscuring An’s original transnational pursuit, as seen in three articles in the 
Shanghai News. The first article, appearing on July 12, 1927, indicated that the Nanjing 
municipal government had organized a large-scale entertainment program for North Expedition 
soldiers, including a performance of An Assassinated Itō. The second piece, on July 31, reported 
that the Union for Severance of Economic Relations with Japan had organized various 
demonstrations, including a performance of the play by the Youth Propaganda Group. Finally, 
the Shanghai News noted that on August 5, the southern city district of Shanghai also staged a 
production of An Chunggŭn Assassinated Itō to inspire patriotism among viewers. A number of 
Chinese dramatizations of the 1909 incident therefore reduced that incident’s transnational 
implications, appropriating the true story to promote the Chinese nationalist project. Despite the 
popular Chinese depiction of An’s story prior to the release of Patriotic Spirit, in other words, 
strong nationalist drives undergirded Chinese dramatizations of the story.  
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Chŏng Kitak’s Patriotic Spirit in China and Transnationalism  
Because the prints of almost all the films produced in Korea in the 1920s and 1930s were 
lost in the Korean War, Chŏng’s films produced in China provide invaluable access to the 
achievements of Korean film artists during the Japanese colonial period.6 Patriotic Spirit attained 
both commercial success and critical acclaim in China. Despite these accomplishments, little 
scholarly work in either Korean or Chinese film studies has examined the aesthetic and political 
implications of Patriotic Spirit in depth or drawn on both Korean- and Chinese-language 
sources, a gap that this article aims to fill.7 
Chŏng Kitak (C: Zheng Jiduo, 1905–1937; figure 2) had a successful career as a 
filmmaker and actor in Shanghai from 1928 to 1934, the golden age of Chinese silent film.8 
During this period, he directed eight films and starred in ten, including co-starring in five with 
Ruan Lingyu (1910–1935), one of the most celebrated actresses in Chinese film history. His 
works ranged from lowbrow martial arts films to classical melodrama and historical drama. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Chŏng Kitak (right) and Mrs. Chŏng Yilsong. Source: Xin yingxing [New Movie Star] 
(1928, 34). 
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According to a 1934 article in United China Pictorial (C: Lianhua huabao), Chŏng’s 
political activism had begun well before his work on Patriotic Spirit, as he had been arrested by 
Japanese police for participating in the March First Independence Movement in Korea when he 
was sixteen years old. Although he was quickly released due to his age, soon thereafter he was 
expelled from his high school, which had banned political activism by students. After graduating 
from another school, he traveled to Japan and entered the Tokyo Music Institute. Despite his 
anticolonial activism, support from his wealthy family allowed him to benefit from an imperial 
education. The absence of records about Chŏng’s Tokyo years makes it difficult to assess the 
Japanese influence on his filmmaking. Upon graduation, he moved to Shanghai for a year, where 
he was exposed to the city’s flourishing film culture. After returning to Korea, he started 
working as a film producer and actor, and his father helped him establish a film production 
company, Chŏng Kitak Productions. Although Chŏng enjoyed some fame as an actor in Korea, 
none of the movies released by his company achieved commercial success.  
In July 1926, the Japanese colonial government implemented a film censorship law that 
prohibited artists from creating movies with any anticolonial implications (Kimu 2011), an 
exacerbated colonial rule that prompted Chŏng to leave for Shanghai in 1928. Upon arriving in 
China, he was introduced to one of the major Shanghai film companies, Great China & Lily (C: 
Dazhonghua baihe), by the renowned Korean-Chinese anticolonial activist Yŏ Unhyong (C: Lü 
Yunheng, 1886–1947). Later that year, Chŏng made his directorial debut with Patriotic Spirit, 
which he also wrote and starred in. According to United China Pictorial, the film “opened up a 
nouvelle path for Chinese film of the time” (1934, 1), although historical or political dramas such 
as Patriotic Spirit were generally unpopular in the 1920s Chinese film market.9 
When Patriotic Spirit premiered in Shanghai in August 1928, most Chinese films fell into 
the martial arts genre. Until the KMT government’s ban on martial arts pictures in the early 
1930s, the martial arts genre was extremely popular among Chinese filmmakers. From 1928 to 
1931, around forty film companies were operating in China, and approximately four hundred 
movies were made, 60 percent of which belonged to the martial arts genre (Cheng 1963, 133). 
Despite the rapid growth of the Chinese film industry, however, American movies still 
dominated the Chinese film market in the 1920s and 1930s (Lee 1999; Zhang 1999). As of April 
1925, British American Tobacco, which owned five major movie theaters in Shanghai, refused to 
Han  36 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 17 (December 2015) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-17) 
 
screen Chinese domestic films. These circumstances made the success of Patriotic Spirit 
especially unusual and noteworthy. 
The final title of Chŏng’s film, Patriotic Spirit, resonated with core concepts of Chinese 
political-social discourse of the period. Unlike in the West and Japan, where central governments 
systematically implemented policies to produce modern national subjects, in China groups of 
intellectuals, artists, and activists took on the mission of mobilizing a sense of a united, strong 
nation due to the lack of a central political power. During this period, as Yoshizawa Seichiro has 
demonstrated, China’s discursive movements from below embodied and propagated the 
emergent concepts of the nation and national spirit (2003, 18–19, 183). Nor was this limited 
within the region to China; as Andre Schmid points out, “Like so much of the new conceptual 
vocabulary of the nation, this [the national soul (K: kukhon) or the national essence (K: kuksu)] 
was a language shared by nationalists throughout East Asia” (2002, 15). From the late nineteenth 
to the early twentieth century, intellectuals and statesmen in both China and Korea dedicated 
themselves to instilling in citizens the idea and sense of a national soul.  
The film also appealed to the discourse and practice of political death—of sacrificing 
one’s life for the nation—which Yoshizawa’s study of Chinese nationalism argues played a 
crucial role in imbuing Chinese citizens with a national consciousness (2003, ch. 5). The film 
ends with a scene in which An is put to death by Japanese prison officers, depicting An as 
unafraid of death and proud of his actions. Although the Confucian notion of loyalty to one’s 
monarch (C: zhong 忠) led many medieval and pre-modern scholar-officials and soldiers to 
sacrifice their lives for their monarchs or dynasties, it was not until the late Qing era (1898–
1911) that death in honor of the abstract entity of the nation emerged as a cultural value. Cultural 
practices, such as memorial services, creation of literature, and various rituals honoring “national 
martyrs” further inspired the Chinese to abandon their lives for the sake of the nation. The theme 
of political death in Patriotic Spirit, therefore, would have resonated with the political death that 
Chinese nationalists idealized, although the contexts of those two deaths were not identical. 
Although the actual film of Patriotic Spirit has been lost, numerous magazines and 
newspaper articles discussing the film, including a detailed summary by Bi Wu in Film Monthly 
(C: dianying yuebao) (Zheng and Liu 1996, 1561–1565), provide ample resources for imagining 
the actors’ performances, the director’s intentions, and the cinematic techniques used in Patriotic 
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Spirit. The political tension that this film generated between Japanese authorities in Shanghai and 
the Chinese censorship bureau led to changes in the film’s title, which indicates that Chŏng was 
forced to compromise his explicit, direct evocation of An Chunggŭn. Chŏng originally titled the 
film 安重根 (K: An Chunggŭn; C: An Chonggen). When Japanese authorities in Shanghai 
learned from newspaper accounts that Chŏng had finished making An Chonggen and that it 
would be released shortly, they demanded that the Chinese government forbid its screening. 
Consequently, Chŏng changed the protagonist’s name from An Chonggen (安重根) to Yan 
Zhongquan（晏仲權); although the two names are pronounced differently in Chinese, their 
pronunciations in Korean are the same. When this accommodation still failed to resolve the 
censorship issue, Chŏng revised the title again, this time to Patriotic Spirit. When the Nationalist 
government authorities censored the film, they also excised many scenes that explicitly 
condemned Japanese colonialism to avoid provoking Japanese authorities in China (Beijing 
Daxue Chaoxian Wenhua Yanjiusuo 1994, 763–768). 
Chŏng’s intended transnational message can be seen in Patriotic Spirit’s focus on a series 
of events that took place prior to An’s assassination of Itō rather than on the assassination itself. 
There are three major changes that Patriotic Spirit makes to An’s story to convey transnational 
anticolonial messages. First, whereas in reality An traveled to China in 1905 to seek assistance 
from Korean expatriates in Shanghai but failed to find any, in the film An’s Chinese comrades 
play indispensable roles in his anticolonial plan to kill a powerful politician of the Japanese 
empire. Second, in reality An Chunggŭn mobilized an anticolonial militia, yet the militia 
consisted only of Koreans and was formed in the Primorsky region of Russia bordering China 
and North Korea. In June and July 1909, An’s militia crossed the Tu River, attacked the Japanese 
army, and waged a battle in Kyŏnghŭng and Hoeryŏng of North Korea (Hanguk Kŭndaesa 
Yŏn’guhoe 1998, 202–203; Yun 2011b, 78–79). In the film, however, thousands of Chinese 
civilians and a handful of Koreans formed the militia. Finally, Chŏng’s dramatization moves the 
setting of An’s activism from Russia to China, spanning Guangdong, Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
Hebei, and Manchuria.  
To make a successful anticolonial film in a semicolonial state, where anticolonial issues 
were less urgent and less consistently challenged than in a colonial state (Shih 2001, 30–40), 
Chŏng provided his Chinese audience what they wanted to see: other small, powerless nations 
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seeking assistance from China, and Chinese offering them indispensible help. This “granting 
assistance to subjugated nations” narrative would have satisfied the sense of Han superiority, 
compensating for the shame and frustration that the presence of multiple imperial forces, 
particularly Japan’s, caused for China.  
The film presents two main characters, one Korean (An) and one Chinese (Zhu), who fall 
in love with each other’s sisters. The Chinese characters and romantic plotline are fictional 
elements that Chŏng introduced to An’s story to represent Sino-Korean solidarity. In Patriotic 
Spirit, when An goes to Shanghai to meet the fictional Chinese revolutionary Zhu Hanlong, Zhu 
immediately agrees to join the anti-Japanese plan. As the film progresses, their comradeship, 
based on their passion for anticolonial revolution, grows stronger and is reinforced by each one’s 
love for the other’s sister. Although another of An’s close Chinese comrades, Zhang Yicheng, is 
also fictional, the other, Liu Dongxia, is modeled on An’s real Korean friend from the Seven 
People’s League (K: Ch’il inhoe), Yu Dongha. Chŏng strategically adapts Yu Dongha’s 
character into a Chinese national so that all the major characters in the film, except for An and 
his sister, are Chinese. Chŏng’s filmic reconstruction of An’s story also depicts his Chinese 
comrades making many sacrifices for the cause, including Zhang Yicheng’s death in northeast 
China, Zhu’s loss of his eyesight during a battle with the Japanese colonial army, and Zhu’s 
sister’s death from lovesickness for An. By introducing new Chinese characters and altering the 
nationality of the historical characters, Chŏng dramatized an important moment in Korean 
history as a story of Sino-Korean comradeship in the struggle against Japanese colonialism, 
catering to his audience’s political-aesthetic sensibility. While indulging the ethnocentrism of 
Chinese viewers, Chŏng simultaneously embedded his transnational message in Patriotic Spirit. 
            An, Zhu, and Pak—a Korean comrade of An’s—visit An’s mother and sister, and An’s 
sister decides to join their effort. The four arrive at the River Tu near the Sino-Korean border, 
where they stay at the home of their comrade Zhang, who provides indispensible assistance to 
An’s group. However, the Korean army, under Japan’s control, follows them to the Sino-Korean 
border and wages a battle against An and his comrades, during which Zhang is significantly 
injured. With no hope of recovery, Zhang pleads with his son and An to leave him behind and 
save themselves. An’s group, including Zhang’s son, escapes to Hong Kong, where Zhu and 
An’s sister fall in love and, without a common language to speak, communicate by writing. 
While An’s group stays at Liu Dongxia’s home in Hong Kong, Zhu’s sister remains in Shanghai, 
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longing for An’s return. Ill with lovesickness, she sees An in a dream, which gives her 
momentary comfort, but, a few days later, she dies.  
Toward the climax, the film shows that An and his comrades travel to the Haigang area 
of northeast China and organize a militia of thousands of Chinese to fight the Japanese colonial 
army in Korea, thereby reconfiguring what had been a Russia-based Korean militia of a few 
hundred into an army of thousands of Chinese and Korean civilians prepared to wage an 
anticolonial war. After a period of training, the militia travels to the River Tu on the Sino-Korean 
border to battle the Japanese colonial army, a scene that represents the ideal Sino-Korean 
relations envisioned by Chŏng: two countries’ transnational tie at the level of the masses rather 
than the individual. Although the militia plans to cross the river to attack the Japanese colonial 
army, Liu Dongxia informs An that Itō Hirobumi is to arrive at the Harbin railway station. Upon 
hearing this, An asks Zhu to take care of his sister and leaves for Harbin. After An shoots Itō, the 
Japanese police arrest him and sentence him to death. An is shown facing his death with a sense 
of calm dignity and of the rightness of his actions, a final scene that inspires the political 
consciousness of its audience as semicolonized people.  
Patriotic Spirit ends with a depiction of the historical assassination, not with a fictional 
Sino-Korean militia fighting a war against colonialism. However, Chŏng’s cinematic rewriting 
of An Chunggŭn’s life to include China in the anticolonial war in Korea reflects what Koreans 
constantly demanded of China at the time—namely, inter-colonial cooperation, a demand of 
which some Chinese were also aware, as seen in the Huazi newspaper (C: Huazi ribao) article 
discussing An Chunggŭn on November 23, 1909. It is fitting, therefore, that the gathering of the 
Sino-Korean militia, whose members are eager to battle against the colonial army in Korea, 
marks the climax of the story, epitomizing the film’s transnational anticolonialism. 
Patriotic Spirit therefore subtly reveals An Chunggŭn’s political beliefs in intra-East 
Asian solidarity by transforming the true story of a Korean activist into a Sino-Korean narrative 
in which the Chinese characters play indispensible roles in the plot. By making a film in 
Shanghai, Chŏng was able to dramatize the transnational and anticolonial implications of An’s 
actions in a way that would not have been possible in Korea at the time. How Chinese 
moviegoers and reviewers perceived and responded to the film is, of course, another matter, as 
addressed in the next section.  
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Nationalist Appropriation in 1928  
The spectatorship of Chinese audiences in the 1920s and 1930s was multifarious; further, 
film viewers and critics creatively co-opted films’ messages beyond directorial intentions. 
Republican-era films provided the Chinese mass public with a reflexive horizon for diverse and 
often conflicting experiences and desires rather than imposing specific ideas and sensations on 
their audiences (Hansen 2000). This interpretation contrasts with the simplistic and largely 
unsupported claim of the few previous studies of Korean filmmakers in 1920s and 1930s 
Shanghai that Patriotic Spirit evoked sympathy for Korea among the Chinese in 1928 as director 
Chŏng intended (Yi 1995; An 2001). My analysis of media reports, advertisements, and reviews 
of Patriotic Spirit that follow demonstrates, first, that the film occasioned unintended readings 
by its audience and, second, that it nonetheless managed to convey daring, radical ideas of 
transnationalism. The effect of conveying these ideas would manifest at a most unexpected 
moment in Sino-Korean relations.  
Articles and advertisements about Patriotic Spirit appearing in the News (C: Xinwenbao), 
which focused on business and economic news, paid attention to the political aspects of the film 
in contrast to the exclusive attention paid by the Shanghai News and the magazine Movie Star to 
the film’s formalistic aspects. An advertisement for Patriotic Spirit that appeared in the News on 
November 7, 1928 (figure 3) states that the purpose of the film is diametrically opposed to that of 
typical martial arts films: “[Patriotic Spirit] makes an outcry [C: yi ku] on behalf of the people 
who were oppressed by [colonial] powers all over the world.… The film serves to develop 
insights of the oppressed…. Larger, philosophical implications underlie this film.” The 
advertisement compares the politically provocative and aesthetically stimulating elements of 
Patriotic Spirit to those of films by D. W. Griffith and Rex Ingram, commenting that “the film 
can awaken the audience’s [political] consciousness.”10 As Shu-mei Shih has pointed out, due to 
its semicolonized status, pre-1937 Republican China was marked by a lack of consistency, 
coherence, and comprehensiveness in political consciousness vis-à-vis colonial powers compared 
to countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, which were directly colonized at the time (2001, 30–45; 
Duara 1995, 224). Under these circumstances, Patriotic Spirit could operate as a reminder of 
China’s subjugation by multiple empires.  
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Figure 3.  Advertisement for Patriotic Spirit. Source: News, November 7, 1928. 
 
As a News advertisement on the same day demonstrates, Chinese newspaper articles and 
advertisements conflated Korean activists’ anticolonialism with Chinese nationalism. Although 
the second Great China & Lily advertisement of the film in that issue notes that the director is a 
Korean with superb artistic acumen, it discusses the film’s political implications as an appeal to 
nationalist sentiment, noting that Patriotic Spirit is “an unprecedented movie that concerns 
nationalism as well as romance. The film politically alerts the entire world [C: jingshi].” This 
advertisement, too, compares Patriotic Spirit to Griffith’s and Ingram’s films, arguing that 
Chŏng’s movie is even better at awakening political consciousness and therefore having a critical 
impact on Chinese people. The advertisement also presents the film’s noble intent to awaken, 
alert, and edify the Chinese masses as an antidote to the decadent atmosphere of Chinese society: 
“The social circumstances [of China] worsen day by day, and people’s minds also tilt toward 
dangerous things” (see figures 4a and 4b). Hence, these advertisements for Patriotic Spirit 
foregrounded Chinese nationalism, eclipsing the transnational anticolonialism underlying the 
film. 
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Figures 4a and 4b. Advertisements for Patriotic Spirit in the News on November 7, 1928 (left) on 
November 8, 1928 (right). 
 
That the Chinese media hardly articulated or even recognized the transnationalism of 
Patriotic Spirit may have been due in part to Great China & Lily’s decision to screen the film 
along with its documentary news film (C: xinwen pian) showing Chiang Kai-shek’s inauguration 
ceremony, making the transnational anticolonialism of Patriotic Spirit less relevant than its 
appeal to Chinese nationalism. The News’s November 11 review of Patriotic Spirit also conflates 
the film’s message with nationalism, claiming that Patriotic Spirit had the power to incite 
vigorous political, nationalist action on the part of its audience. In the Shanghai News, a 
November 29 article describes it as “an excellent art piece that can stimulate national 
characteristics [C: guominxing],” and another remarks that Patriotic Spirit is a rare success story 
in Chinese film history in that it attained both commercial success and critical acclaim. Whereas 
Chinese audiences appeared to entirely appropriate Patriotic Spirit, suppressing its transnational 
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dimensions for the sake of nationalism, that appropriation and integration of An’s story into 
Chinese culture over two decades, I argue, led unexpectedly to a rupture in Chinese nationalism 
that the next section will analyze.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Still photo from Patriotic Spirit with caption noting the true story behind the film. 
Source: New Movie Star (1928, 33).  
 
An Chunggŭn and a Rupture in Nationalism 
One Chinese source in 1928 explicitly, albeit briefly, mentioned the Korean nationality of 
the protagonist in Patriotic Spirit. This example shows that Chinese discourse and narratives 
about that transnational artwork were not entirely obscured by hegemonic Chinese nationalism. 
In 1928, the magazine New Movie Star (C: Xin yingxing) declared that Patriotic Spirit 
dramatized the true story of a Korean anticolonial activist: “Patriotic Spirit is a drama based on 
the real story of a Korean, An Chunggŭn, who assassinated Itō Hirobumi, the prime minister of 
Japan” (see figure 5). According to the magazine, “Chŏng's Patriotic Spirit has different [artistic] 
colors in comparison to other domestic [Chinese] films.” Although New Movie Star failed to 
further explain how the film reconstructed Korean history within the Chinese context, unlike 
other print media, it did clearly point to An Chunggŭn’s story as the film’s basis. Whereas 
numerous newspaper articles and other magazine reviews either reduced Patriotic Spirit to a 
Chinese nationalist film or highlighted the film’s formalistic aspects only—such as the actors’ 
performances, the use of light and props, camera techniques, and editing and directing skills—
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New Movie Star clarified that the 1909 anticolonial struggle of Korea against the Japanese 
empire was the actual model of Patriotic Spirit. 
  It was not until the 1931 Wanbaoshan Incident that newspaper coverage of the film 
located An’s actions primarily in their own political context. That year represented a crucial 
moment in which tensions in Sino-Korean relations were exacerbated due to this violent conflict, 
whose death toll exceeded one hundred. In April 1931, Chinese official Hao Yongde granted a 
contract to eight Korean farmers to lease land in Wanbaoshan without approval from the local 
government. One of those eight farmers, Li Sŭnghun, and roughly 180 other Korean farmers 
moved to the Wanbaoshan area, initiating an irrigation project to cultivate their lands, which 
caused problems in nearby land held by Chinese farmers. The Chinese farmers petitioned the 
local government to stop the Korean farmers’ construction, a demand that ultimately forced the 
Koreans to discontinue the project. The Japanese consulate in Manchuria had its police suppress 
the Chinese farmers’ opposition, pushing ahead the irrigation construction, which was completed 
in June 1931. On July 1, some four hundred Chinese farmers, provoked by the completion of the 
irrigation project, broke out in protest and buried about one kilometer of the irrigated path, which 
led to a clash between the two groups: the Chinese police and farmers versus the Japanese police 
and Korean farmers (Zhongguo guomindang xuanchuanbu 1931; Kim 2010).  A number of 
participants in that initial conflict were injured, but there was no loss of life.  
 Taking advantage of this tension between the Chinese and the Koreans in Manchuria, the 
Japanese, as part of their unofficial “Discord-Provoking Policy” (J: rikan seisaku 離間政策), 
manipulated a Korean journalist—Kim Yisam from the Chosŏn Daily (K: Chosŏn ilbo)—into 
writing a misleading and provocative article about the Sino-Korean schism in Manchuria on July 
2, 1931, in which he claimed that the conflict on July 1 had resulted in tragic death of a number 
of Korean farmers. As Yi’s study (2012) has demonstrated, in the colonial era the significant 
economic power that overseas Chinese exerted in Korea generated discontent and ethnonational 
feeling against Chinese among Koreans. The Sino-Korean tension in Wanbaoshan and the false, 
sensational reportage about it catalyzed and intensified anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea. More 
crucially, when the Chinese consulate requested that the Government-General protect overseas 
Chinese upon the outbreak of the incident, the Government-General failed to dispatch a 
sufficient number of police to control the violence. As a result, 127 Chinese living in Korea were 
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killed and 195 injured; three Koreans were killed and 33 injured (Yi 2012, 417–477). In 
retaliation, Chinese killed scores of Koreans (the exact number is unclear) near the Korean-
Chinese border. Although intellectuals and activists in both countries urged the masses not to be 
swayed by Japan’s colonial scheme, the hostility between the two countries reached a climax in 
1931 (Kikuchi 2007).  
Despite a wide range of Chinese nationalisms, from exclusive to inclusive strands, 
previous scholarship has argued that the Han/non-Han divide was at the heart of Republican-era 
Chinese nationalism (Yokoyama 2009). Yet some examples of Chinese responses to the 
Wanbaoshan Incident, discussed below, show that An Chunggŭn’s true story escaped the 
Han/non-Han binary underlying the hegemonic Chinese nationalism. As my analysis of three 
reactions to the Wanbaoshan Incident demonstrates, the Chinese placed An Chunggŭn in the 
Korean-yet-non-Korean category, thereby failing to delimit his nationality. I argue that these 
three cases, among many similar others, thus show that the symbol of An Chunggŭn within 
Chinese discourses and narratives over time came to deconstruct the dichotomy that the Chinese 
imposed between Han and non-Han at the height of anti-Koreanism in China. The Chinese critics 
examined here simultaneously recognized An’s Korean nationality and refused to impose 
national characteristics on An. Hence, I argue, An became a symbolic aporia within the 
Republican-era discursive paradigm.  
The following examples of Chinese use of An’s assassination of Itō reveal that Chinese 
discourses situated An in an ambiguous category, distinguishing him from other “blameworthy” 
Koreans who were cast as “culturally inferior” non-Hans. The distinction between Han and non-
Han is based on Hans’ supposed cultural superiority, through which Hans are supposed to 
civilize or edify “barbaric” non-Hans. When condemning other ethnicities for their savage minds 
and low culture, Han-Chinese intellectuals offered Han culture and knowledge as a model that 
other ethnicities should embrace and emulate. What underlay Han nationalism was the idea that 
non-Hans could not improve themselves without adopting the Hans’ high culture. Upon the 
outbreak of the Wanbaoshan Incident, however, Han-Chinese critics suggested that An 
Chunggŭn’s legacy offered the solution to Korean “barbarity.” As a corrective to Korean 
propensities, therefore, An’s activism became part of Han culture. Hence, the nationalist logic 
was ruptured, because although An was non-Han, he belonged to a Han culture that could rectify 
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and discipline non-Hans. Due to this liminal quality, An Chunggŭn as a symbol unsettled the 
Han/non-Han divide, deconstructing Republican-era nationalism. 
The first example of 1930s appropriation of An Chunggŭn’s story underscores the 
opposition between individuals and the government in the midst of a national crisis. On 
December 11, 1932, the Shanghai News reported that a ninety-three-year-old man, Ma Xiangbo, 
had urged the Chinese to support the militia that fought the Japanese puppet regime in 
Manchuria. Strikingly, Ma quotes An, using the words that best represent An’s transnational 
vision of Eastern solidarity, although Ma employs these words to support his own anti-
institutionalism by highlighting An’s individual and direct action. Arguing that it is urgent that 
every household in China support the militia of the Northern Expedition and not be subjugated 
by Japanese colonial power, Ma quotes from An’s essay, which promoted a Sino-Korean alliance 
that challenges ethnonationalism: 
My country’s enemy is also China’s enemy. I killed Itō for the relationship of our 
two nations and also for the great mission [C: dashi 大事] of the East. The 
Chinese people ought to understand what lies at the heart of my political path and 
realize that the two nations share the same communal fate. In so doing, [we] ought 
to save twenty million people of my country and four hundred million of China, 
who are amidst dire suffering [C: shuihuo zhi zhong].... Until Korea achieves 
independence, the Chinese will not have high-pillowed [i.e., carefree] days.   
 
It is not political leaders or institutions, Ma argues, but pioneering small groups and individuals 
like An Chunggŭn who have built and shaped Chinese history. Ma further contends that the 
Heaven, the Boxers (C: Yihetuan), and the Master of Eight Countries (C: Baguo zhi chi) had 
determined world history at crucial junctures. In Ma’s account, An Chunggŭn represents the core 
of Han-Chinese history and also what has made that history move forward. Ma not only puts An 
Chunggŭn in the same category as the Boxers and the Master of Eight Countries that embody the 
Han-Chinese cultural legacy, but also relies on An’s political philosophy, even more than Han 
examples, to endorse Daoism and anti-institutionalism in the modern context. Ma argues that An 
epitomizes the collective Han-Chinese experience, especially its radical, subversive aspects. 
Hence, in this piece, An symbolizes a Han-Chinese characteristic that defies any institutional 
constraints, including ethnonationalist ones. While acknowledging An’s Korean nationality, Ma 
still argues that An exemplifies one of the most crucial parts of Han-Chinese history, culture, and 
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lived experience. This example therefore shows that by 1932 An had become a sign that 
disrupted the ethnonational boundary between the Korean and the Chinese. 
 The second example, a Shanghai News article dated September 4, 1931, introduced to its 
readers the fifth volume of China Magazine (C: Zhonghua zazhi), the contents of which included 
articles about the infamous 1931 Wanbaoshan Incident, other forms of Sino-Korean tension, and 
Jing Wan’s biography of An Chunggŭn. Referencing Patriotic Spirit, an unidentified author 
draws on the film and other sources to criticize Koreans for killing innocent Chinese out of anger 
and not being able to emulate An Chunggŭn. The author stresses that if Koreans acted as An 
Chunggŭn had (either in reality or in the film)—though not explaining precisely what that way 
is—then the tragic Wanbaoshan event would not have occurred. Rather than suggesting Han-
Chinese examples that Koreans ought to follow, the author endorses the Korean case of An as an 
ideal to cultivate the “uncivilized” Korean mind. As discussed earlier, however, An neither lived 
in China nor became acquainted with any Chinese in his life. Even during a short visit to 
Shanghai in 1905, he contacted only Korean expatriates, rather than Chinese activists, to seek 
assistance for anti-Japanese movements. Furthermore, a range of political, religious, and 
philosophical ideas—Catholicism, Confucianism, Asianism, and nationalism—constituted An’s 
highly syncretic thoughts (Rausch 2012). An’s autobiography, of which Chinese renditions were 
published in Shanghai in the 1910s and 1920s and circulated in China afterwards, shows a strong 
Catholic influence on An throughout his political career. Chinese newspapers also often 
mentioned An’s close ties with Catholic priests during and following An’s trial. As much as An 
appeared to be proximate to Han-Chinese culture, teachings and thoughts of non-Chinese origin 
formed a central part of An’s philosophy. Yet the author of the Shanghai News article 
nonetheless contends that An, rather than other Han-Chinese national martyrs, should serve as a 
political model to “enlighten” non-Han Koreans. If the article’s intended audience had been 
Koreans, admonishing them would have been a reason for mentioning An Chunggŭn, because 
Korean readers would be more familiar with political figures of the same nationality. However, 
its target audience was Chinese who felt outraged about Koreans’ killing of innocent overseas 
Chinese. Most importantly, the article’s overall tone is not only ethnonationalist but also 
Sinocentric imperialist, a stance that attributes the problem of the Wanbaoshan Incident not to a 
political situation between China and Korea but to a lack of Koreans’ cultural cultivation. 
Acclaiming An Chunggŭn in this context thus indicates that An was deemed to embody Han 
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culture to fix “barbaric minds,” beyond simply implying that An was exceptional and better than 
other Koreans. Within this logic, An comes to represent Han culture despite being a non-Han 
Korean who neither had contact with living Han culture nor sought an anticolonial ideal in Han-
centered tradition, a contradiction that reveals a rupture in Chinese nationalism. 
The final example of a Chinese response to the Wanbaoshan Incident also situates An 
Chunggŭn ambiguously—as Korean yet non-Korean—showing that the Chinese nationalist 
demarcation of cultural and ethnic belongings failed to be held. On October 21, 1931, the 
Shanghai News published an article by Xu Jie titled “Outdated Method of Annexing Korea,” 
which stated that “Korea has been my country’s tributary state,” suggesting that even four 
decades after the official end of Korea’s tributary relation to China, some Chinese still viewed 
Korea from an imperialist perspective. Xu Jie delineates how Korea was colonized by Japan to 
caution Chinese readers that Korea’s tragic history might foreshadow their own country’s 
political future. He describes how Koreans resisted Japanese oppression (e.g., by forming myriad 
anticolonial groups, both public and underground; destroying railroads; and cutting electrical 
power to public facilities of the colonial government). Xu Jie underlines that although all of these 
efforts turned out to be futile, “only An Chunggŭn’s assassination of Itō in Harbin was an 
acknowledgeable resistance [C: chaqiang renyi].... Although I have described the fall of the 
Korean nation-state, I have no time to lament for them.” Xu’s determined apathy and dismissive 
stance toward colonized Koreans reflect the prevailed anti-Korean sentiment in China following 
the Wanbaoshan Incident, rather than a reasonable critique of Korean anticolonialism. First, 
when asserting that An made an exceptional case for anti-Japanese resistance, Xu fails to provide 
his readers with any evidence. Second, Xu’s reason for not sympathizing with the plight of 
colonized Koreans—the lack of time—has nothing to do with political, cultural, or historical 
elements, indicating an irrational aspect of nationalism. Third, the death of Itō actually prompted 
Japan to accelerate a colonizing process in Korea with more coercive measures, a historical-
political fact that several Chinese journalists and critics have pinpointed, but that Xu’s account 
obscures. Finally, the political impact of Korean anticolonial movements in the 1910s and 1920s 
on East Asia, which ranged from the 1919 March First Uprising to the 1929 Kwangju Student 
Protest, far surpassed that of An Chunggŭn’s action. The contrast between Xu’s assessment of 
An Chunggŭn and the actual limits of An’s activism thus shows that the Chinese discursive 
practice of commemoration and revival turned An’s true story into a myth immune to Han-
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nationalist condemnation of Koreans. Xu’s refusal to criticize An Chunggŭn with no reasonable 
grounds betrays the unarticulated Chinese consciousness or will to categorize An as not-Korean. 
That is to say, what makes Xu’s discussion of An Chunggŭn a discursive aporia is not because 
Xu contends that An is an exceptional case, but because Xu does so with no explicable reasons. 
By attributing both Korean and non-Korean qualities to An Chunggŭn, therefore, Xu’s article 
symptomizes a rupture in Republican-era Chinese nationalism.  
As these examples illustrate, Chinese discourse about the Korean figure An Chunggŭn 
confounded the structure of Chinese nationalism—the opposition between us and them, or Han 
and non-Han—thereby revealing the limitations of nationalist appropriation. That is to say, even 
when Chinese appropriated Korean culture, that appropriation unwittingly caused a rupture 
within Chinese nationalism. Although reactions to the 1931 Wanbaoshan Incident manifested 
that latent change, the constellation of existing political events, social discourses, and literary and 
cinematic narratives overdetermined that rupture within Chinese nationalism.  
 
Conclusion 
 By tracking changes in Chinese audiences’ responses to An Chunggŭn’s story before and 
after the release of Patriotic Spirit and the tragic Wanbaoshan Incident, this article has 
highlighted a twofold aspect of Chinese nationalist power that excluded other nations and minor 
ethnicities yet inadvertently included what the Chinese themselves excluded. An Chunggŭn as a 
symbol came to escape the nationalist distinction between Koreans and Chinese, or the 
opposition between Han and non-Han, as Sino-Korean cultural relations evolved in the late 
1920s and 1930s. As Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionism has illuminated, the collapse of an 
opposition is part of the system rather than an exception in humanistic discourses (1978). 
Whereas Derrida identified examples that preceded an opposition, my analysis has uncovered 
how the sign of An Chunggŭn shifted from a specific referent embodying Korean nationality to a 
signifier that disrupted the Han/non-Han divide over two decades.  
Chŏng Kitak’s Patriotic Spirit in Shanghai and the Chinese responses to the story also 
reveal which aesthetic strategies colonized artists in this foreign, semicolonial state were able to 
take when deprived of means to reject Chinese nationalism. Unable to challenge 
ethnonationalism openly, the diasporic artist Chŏng subtly insinuated transnationalism while 
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catering to the political and artistic demands of his Chinese audience, as evidenced in his 
rewriting of An’s life into a Sino-Korean narrative in which the Chinese played indispensible 
roles in realizing An’s anticolonial ideals. However, that compromise failed to bring the story to 
a conclusion. Although Patriotic Spirit was appropriated and transformed by Chinese contexts 
and demands, it also helped make An’s story part of Chinese culture as An Chunggŭn replaced 
and usurped the authority of Chinese anticolonial activists. Like Lydia Liu’s (1995) and Michel 
de Certeau’s (1984) analyses of how literary and everyday practices of the powerless become 
politically productive without rejecting or challenging any superior force, this article 
demonstrates how a Korean artist’s aesthetic practice in Shanghai gradually brought about a 
rupture in Chinese ethnonationalism without explicitly resisting that nationalism. The strategy of 
escaping nationalism without leaving it, an example of what de Certeau calls the “consumption” 
by the powerless of products of the powerful, concerns ways of using and adapting what belongs 
to the powerful to meet the interests and ends of the powerless. The diasporic artist and 
colonized Korean Chŏng in semicolonial Shanghai did not resist but rather employed Chinese 
nationalism to his own anticolonial end. Hence, my analysis has shown how the colonized film 
artist deflected colonial and nationalist power in China in a way that involved political 
compromise, yet that compromise ultimately generated a rupture in Chinese nationalist ideology.  
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Notes 
 
1 Upon the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the Japanese emperor 
proclaimed that Japan was waging war “to protect peace in the East and the independence 
of Korea [from Russia’s invasion]” (Ichikawa 1979, 143). However, following the 
Empire of Japan’s victory, Japan forced Korea to sign the Japan-Korea Protectorate 
Treaty (1905) and dissolve its existing political parties. To revoke this unequal treaty, 
Korea’s King Kochong secretly dispatched envoys to the Hague Conference on World 
Peace (1907), yet the attending countries refused to talk to them. That “underhanded” 
attempt led to the 1907 Japan-Korea treaty that provided Resident-General Itō Hirobumi 
with the authority to govern Korea’s internal affairs. King Kochong was dethroned as a 
result, and Korea’s military sovereignty was annulled, a dramatic political change that 
prompted the Korean masses, including An Chunggŭn, to mobilize anti-Japanese militia 
movements. For a historical-political background of the 1909 event and An’s trial process, 
see Nakano (1984, 1996).  For a detailed study of the historical Japan-Korea relations, 
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Itō’s political career, and An Chunggŭn’s activism, see Ichikawa (1979). For an analysis 
of the complex religious, political, and philosophical bases of An’s anticolonial activism, 
see Hwang (2009) and Rausch (2012). For the responses of Chinese, Russian, and other 
Western journalists to An’s assassination of Itō, see Ichikawa (1979, 186–208) and Bang 
(2010). Bang’s article introduces a few Chinese and Russian articles that critiqued An 
Chunggŭn and lamented Itō’s death, a stance that most previous Korean-language studies 
of An overlooked. For studies that focus on Korea-Russia relations, see Pak (2009), 
Sumbirtseva (Сuмбирцева) (2010), and Sin (2010). For studies that compare An’s view 
of Russia to others’, see Tikhonov (2009) and Finch (2012).   
2 Ye Tianni’s Biography of An Chunggŭn (C: An Chonggen chuan) and Zheng Yuan’s An 
Chunggŭn are Chinese-language biographies of An by Chinese authors. The exact years 
of publication are unknown, as the copyright pages of both books have been lost. 
However, scholars conjecture that Ye’s biography was published in 1914 or 1915 and 
Zheng’s was published in the 1920s. A Chinese-language biography of An by Pak Ŭnsik, 
a Korean scholar living in Shanghai, appeared in the first issue of Republican Report (C: 
Minguo huibao) in 1913 and was later published as an independent volume, the 
publication year of which is also unknown. Chang notes that a number of Chinese poems 
also dramatized the 1909 assassination. In 1915, the magazine Virtue-Esteem Bulletin (C: 
Chongde gongbao) serialized a novel dramatizing An; in 1921, Historical Novel/Drama 
in Qing (C: Qing shi yanyi) by Lu Shi’e also dramatized An’s true story. Among all 
genres, plays were the most frequent and drew much attention from mass audiences 
(Chang 2010).  
3 The periodicals include East Magazine (C: Dongfang zazhi), China (C: Zhonghua, 
Shanghai-based), Benefitting All Round (C: Guangyi congbao), New Century (C: Xin 
shiji), Daxia Collection (C: Daxia congkan), People (C: Guomin, Shanghai-based), 
Foreign Affairs (C: Waijiao bao), and South (C: Nan Bao), among many others. 
4 The 1842 Treaty of Nanjing made Shanghai a semicolonial treaty port, a special zone 
whereby imperialists reached the interior of China only indirectly. Since the semicolonial 
state delimited imperialist power within treaty ports, assistance from local elites and 
merchants was indispensible for European and Japanese empires to attain commercial-
financial interest. For studies probing interdependency between imperialists and Chinese 
merchants and elites, see Walker (1999) and Goodman (2000). Goodman’s article on the 
1893 Shanghai Silver Jubilee offers excellent insight on Shanghainese capacities of 
reconfiguring the European-led festival as a Chinese event, a novel appropriation that 
recognizes the presence of foreign powers yet simultaneously celebrates the Empress 
Dowager’s birthday and native-place identities. Although Goodman focused on one 
specific moment prior to the first Sino-Japanese war (1894–1895), the ingenious Chinese 
culture of appropriating semicolonial, modern practices continued through the 1920s and 
1930s. Chinese did not persistently resist Western culture, yet “advanced” European 
influences failed to replace or marginalize “backward” Chinese culture, unlike other 
Asian countries. Instead, both modern Western and traditional Chinese culture thrived 
side by side. Japanese condemned this resilient quality of Chinese culture, calling 
Shanghai a “demon city” (Liu [Ryū] 2000). For studies examining the fragmented, 
multiple, and multilayered forms of semicolonial domination that lacks institutionalized 
colonialism in most parts of China, showing the partial and limited power of imperialists 
Han  52 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 17 (December 2015) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-17) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
in China, see Cohen (1984), Duara (1995, 224), and Shih (2001). For Shanghai’s 
cosmopolitanism as a consequence of semicolonial cultural conditions that go beyond the 
dictates of nationalism, see Bergère (1981) and Shih (2001). For a literature review of 
Shanghai studies from the 1990s to 2010, see Fogel (2010). 
5 Sino-Japanese relations during this period also provide an important context for Chinese 
discourse and narratives about An Chunggŭn. Since the late 1910s, Japan-China relations 
had become multifaceted, as large-scale anticolonial movements in Japan’s (semi-
)colonies broke out, and the United States arose as a world power (Yonetani 2006). From 
the late 1910s to 1930s, Chinese and Japanese intellectuals exchanged ideas and 
endeavored to mobilize international mass movements against the Japanese Empire and 
Chinese warlords, linking the momentum of the Chinese May Fourth Movement and that 
of the Taisho democracy movement (Yonetani 2006; Tanaka 1993, 276–277). Japanese 
thinkers—such as Yoshino Sakuzō (1878–1933) and Yanaihara Tadao (1893–1961) in 
the interwar years and Miki Kiyoshi (1897–1945) and Ozaki Hotsumi (1901–1944) 
during World War II—viewed China, Taiwan, and Korea not as backward colonies to be 
dominated, but as potential allies for Japan. Previous studies have shown that China 
affected policy making in the metropole, and therefore the colony-metropole relationship 
was not unidirectional. However, by the early 1930s, international and transnational 
movements within Asia became distinctively militarist and imperialist (Conrad and Duara 
2013, 22). As multifaceted as Sino-Japanese relations were, China’s antagonism toward 
Japan prevailed throughout the Republican era.  
6 From 1928 until the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937), six Korean film artists were 
active in Shanghai, as Yi (1995) and An (2001) note. Kim Ilsong (known as Zheng 
Yisong in China) played a lead character in Patriotic Spirit (1928), Flaming Cave and 
Sword (C: Huo ku gangdao 1928), Three Heroes Compete for a Beauty (C: Sanxiong duo 
mei 1928), and Woman Pirate (C: Nü haidao 1929). Li Kyŏngson directed Yangtze River 
(1930), in which Korean Chŏn Ch’anggŭn played a lead character, and Han Ch’angsŏp 
was its cameraman. Literary critic Kim Kwangchu’s film reviews appeared in Film Art 
Theories (C: Dianying yishi lun) and Chinese-language newspapers. Finally, Chŏng Kitak 
had the most successful career in Shanghai among Korean film artists. See note 7 below. 
7 In Korean film studies, Yi Yŏng-il’s 1995 article is the first study to identify such work, 
which has more recently been examined in an MA thesis by An T’aegŭn (2001). 
Notwithstanding their important contributions, neither work analyzes the films in depth 
or examines the responses of Chinese media. Also, the existing scholarship on 
Republican-era Chinese film has not addressed Chinese-language films made by 
foreigners. Pioneering studies by Yingjin Zhang (1999) and Paul Pickowicz (2012) have 
illuminated highly dynamic, multifarious, and polyvalent characteristics of early Chinese 
films in terms of aesthetic qualities and sociopolitical themes. More recent works by 
Zhen Zhang (2005) and Chris Berry and Mary Farquhar (2006) problematize the 
nationalist assumption underlying previous studies and stress the overall transnational 
character of film media. Zhen Zhang redefines the Republican Shanghai film culture as a 
mediator of the global cinematic “language” of Hollywood film and Chinese experiences 
and sensibilities. Similarly, Berry and Farquhar focus on the constituted nature of 
nationalism by foregrounding Sinophone films produced outside the mainland (e.g., in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and other areas of Chinese diaspora). These works 
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reveal the varied themes and forms of Republican Chinese films, spanning feminist, 
socialist, nationalist, anticolonial, and anticapitalist works. However, even when extant 
studies challenge the idea of Chineseness through the notion of transnationalism, namely 
China’s relations with the West and the Chinese diaspora, they rarely analyze Asian 
filmmakers’ works made and shown in Shanghai.  
8 Chinese cinema in the 1920s and 1930s emerged out of tensions between the influence of 
American film and that of Chinese traditions, as Zhen Zhang (2005) has shown. Miriam 
Hansen (2000) has cogently argued that 1920s and 1930s Shanghai cinema falls into her 
critical category, “a sensory-reflexive horizon” for the contradictory experience of 
modernity, an aesthetic quality through which a film conveys different meanings to 
different people. Film offered the Chinese public a vernacular whereby mass audiences 
found expression and recognition by others in public. Shanghai cinema of the 1920s and 
1930s as an instance of vernacular modernism provides us with an analytical tool to 
examine film’s unique role in articulating and disseminating a distinctive historical 
experience of the time. Yingjin Zhang (2003) notes that although the success of Orphan 
Rescues Grandfather (1923) caused a rapid rise in Chinese film production, increased 
prices of film stock and overproduction of low-quality films resulted in the bankruptcy of 
small companies. “From 179 companies in 1927, the number nose-dived to 20 in 1928, 
and fewer than a dozen were in business by 1930” (Zhang 2003, 9). Upon Chiang Kai-
shek’s takeover of Shanghai in 1927, the Nationalist Party strove to regulate influence of 
Hollywood movies and Western theater and to establish a new civic culture for the 
Chinese-administered portions of Shanghai, an attempt that included repression of leftist 
films. Zhang (2003) also notes that the establishment of the Nationalist central 
government in Nanjing in 1927 interfered with the market-driven characteristic of 
Chinese film production, an enforced cultural shift that promoted nationalist ideology. 
The Nationalists’ top-down endeavor to police private leisure ended up as an 
unsuccessful project due to little support from masses and immense corruption 
(Wakeman 1995).  
9 In 1926, Chŏng unsuccessfully tried to export Li Kyŏngson’s film Crown of Phoenix (K: 
Ponghwang ŭi myŏllyukwan), produced by Chŏng Kitak Studio, to Shanghai. Since 
moving to Shanghai, Chŏng had made films exclusively with Great China & Lily from 
1928 to 1930. In 1928 Chŏng directed, in addition to Patriotic Spirit, two more films in 
which he also played a lead character: Three Heroes Compete for the Beauty (C: 
Sanxiong duo mei) and Flaming Cave and Steel Sword (C: Huo ku gangdao). In 1929, 
Chŏng directed two films: Woman Pirate (C: Nü haidao) and Flower of Screen (C: Yinmu 
zhi hua). The latter is also known as Romance of Liyuan (C: Liyuan Yanshi), which was 
written by Zhu Shouju. That same year Chŏng played a lead character in four other films: 
Pearl Crown (C: Zhenzhu guan), Great Destruction of Nine Dragon Mountain (C: Dapo 
jiulongshan), Burning Down Nine Dragon Mountain (C: Huashao jiulongshan), and 
Precious Mirror of Desire (C: Qingyu baojian). In 1929, all the six films that Chŏng 
either directed or starred in fell into the martial arts genre. In 1930, Chŏng directed, 
starred in, and wrote the screenplay of Knight in Black (C: Heiyi qishi). When Great 
China & Lily restructured in 1931, Chŏng left for Tokyo, where he directed March Song 
of Shanghai (C: Shanghai jinxing qu) for Imperial Cinema Company (C: Diguo yinghua 
gongsi). Chŏng had completed approximately half of the film when the company forbade 
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him from continuing to shoot due to perceived sympathy with China’s boycott of “enemy 
goods,” including those produced by the Japanese.  Chŏng returned to Shanghai, as 
Imperial Cinema Company forced him to stop filming. Although Chŏng wanted to make 
new-style films, he was unable to proceed for several months due to a lack of funds. In 
1932, United China Cooperation (C: Lianhua yingye gongsi) embarked on a new project 
to revitalize domestic films, and it invited Chŏng to participate as a director. Two months 
after joining United China, he completed the film A Way Out (C: Chulu, 1933). In 1933 
and 1934, Chŏng directed A Way Out (C: Guangming zhi lu) and Goodbye Shanghai (C: 
Zaihuiba Shanghai)—his last film—respectively. 
10  Chinese audiences in the 1920s enthusiastically responded to Griffith’s films. The Birth 
of a Nation (1915) was especially well received, “arous[ing] considerable patriotism 
among Chinese audiences” (Chen 2013, 27) despite U.S. controversies due to the film’s 
racism. Chen (2013) argues that D.W. Griffith was the single most influential Hollywood 
director in China during the silent film era. Given Griffith’s fame and popularity in 1920s 
Chinese culture, the reviews acclaiming Chŏng more than Griffith show Chinese 
enthusiasm toward Patriotic Spirit. For more details on the Chinese reception of 
Griffith’s works and Griffith’s influence on Chinese perception of film, see Chen (2013).  
 
References 
 
An Chunggŭn. 2010. Tongyang p'yŏnghwaron Oe [A Treatise on Peace in the East and other 
writing]. Seoul: Ch’aeryun. 
An T’aegŭn. 2001. “Ilje Kangjŏmki ŭi Sanghai pa Han’guk Yŏnghwa’yin Yŏn’gu”[Korean film 
artists in Shanghai during the Japanese colonial era]. MA thesis, Hankuk University of 
Foreign Studies. 
Bang Kwangsuk [Pang Kwangsŏk]. 2010. “‘Itō Hirobumi chŏkyŏk sakŏn’e daehan kakkuk ŏllon 
ŭi panŭng kwa ilbon ch’ŏngpu ŭi insik”[Responses of Japan and other countries to the Itō 
Hirobumi incident]. Dongbuga Yeoksa Nonchong 30: 39–64. 
Beijing Daxue Chaoxian Wenhua Yanjiusuo. 1994. Yesulsa [History of art]. Beijing: Minzu. 
Bergère, Marie-Claire. 1981. “‘The Other China’: Shanghai from 1919 to 1949.” In Shanghai: 
Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis, edited by Christopher Howe, 1–34. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Berry, Chris, and Mary Farquhar. 2006. China on Screen: Cinema and Nation. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Braester, Yomi. 2003. Witness against History: Literature, Film, and Public Discourse in 
Twentieth-Century China. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Chang Hoepang. 2010. “Min’guk Siki Chungguk Munye Chakp’um kwa An Chunggŭn ŭi 
Hyŏngsang”[Image of An Chunggŭn in Chinese literature during the Republican era]. An 
Chunggŭn kwa Dongyang P’yŏnghwaron [An Chungŭn and A Treatise on Peace in the 
East], edited by An Chunggŭn Ŭisa Kinyŏm Saŏphoe, 417–440. Seoul: Ch’aeryun. 
Chen, Jianhua. 2013. “D.W. Griffith and the Rise of Chinese Cinema in Early 1920s Shanghai.” 
In The Oxford Handbook of Chinese Cinemas, edited by Carlos Rojas and Eileen Chow, 
23–38. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cheng Jihua. 1963. Zhongguo Dianying Fazhanshi [History of Chinese film development]. 
Beijing: Zhongguo Dianying. 
Han  55 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 17 (December 2015) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-17) 
 
Cohen, Paul. 1984. Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent 
Chinese Past. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Conrad, Sebastian, and Prasenjit Duara. 2013. Viewing Regionalisms from East Asia: Regions 
and Regionalisms in the Modern World. Washington: American Historical Association. 
De Certeau, Michel. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Derrida, Jacques. 1978. Writing and Difference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Duara, Prasenjit. 1995. Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern 
China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1998. “Transnationalism in the Era of Nation-States: China, 1900–1945.” Development 
and Change 29 (4): 647–670.  
Finch, Michael. 2012. “Suicide to Assassination: A Comparative Study of the Views of Min 
Yŏnghwan and An Chunggŭn on Peace in East Asia and Their Responses to the Japanese 
Protectorate over Korea.” Acta Koreana 15 (2): 293–309.   
Fogel, Joshua. 2010. “The Recent Boom in Shanghai Studies.” Journal of the History of Ideas 71 
(2): 313–333. 
Goodman, Bryna. 2000. “Improvisations on a Semicolonial Theme, or, How to Read a 
Celebration of Transnational Urban Community.” The Journal of Asian Studies 59 (4): 
889–926. 
Han’guk Kŭndaesa Yŏn’guhoe. 1998. Han’guk Tongnip Undongsa Kang’ŭi [History of the 
Korean independence movement]. Seoul: Han’ul. 
Hansen, Miriam. 2000. “Fallen Women, Rising Stars, New Horizons: Shanghai Silent Film as 
Vernacular Modernism.” Film Quarterly 54 (1): 10–22. 
Harrison, Henrietta. 2001. China. London: Arnold. 
Hirano Satoshi. 2004. Shin Teikoku to Chibetto mondai [The Qing empire and the Tibet issue]. 
Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai.  
Hwang Chaemun. 2011. An Chunggŭn Pyŏngchŏn [Biography of An Chunggŭn]. Seoul: 
Hangyŏre. 
Hwang Chongnyŏl. 2009. “‘An Chunggŭn p’yŏn Kyorisŏ e nat’anan Ch’ŏn, In, Sekye yihae” 
[Heaven, benevolence, and world in religious texts edited by An Chunggŭn]. In An 
Chunggŭn kwa kŭ Sidae [An Chunggŭn and his times], edited by Sin Unyong, 283–342. 
Seoul: Kyŏng’in Munhwasa. 
Ichikawa Masaaki. 1979. An Jūkon to Nikkan kankeishi [An Chunggŭn and the history of Japan-
Korea relations]. Tokyo: Hara Shobō. 
Jiang Hanyang. 1933. “Shangchang sheying: kan pai Chulu” [On-stage photography: Visiting a 
studio shooting of Way Out] Lianhua Huabao 2 (5): 3.  
Kikuchi Kazutaka. 2007. “Manpōzan—Chōsen jiken no jittai to kōzō” [Wanbaoshan—reality 
and structure behind the incident in Korea]. Ningen Bunka 22: 15–79. 
Kim Chae-yong. 2010. Manbosan Sakŏn Kwa Han’guk Kŭndae Munhak [ The Wanbaoshan 
Incident and modern Korean literature]. Seoul: Yŏngnak. 
Kimu Chonmin. 2011. “Shokuminchi Chōsen ni okeru katsudo shashin firumu ken'etsu kisoku ni 
kansuru ichi kōsatsu”[Motion picture/film censorship law in colonial Korea]. Media Shi 
Kenkyū 30: 109–133. 
Kukka Pohunch’ŏ. 1995. Aju Che’il Ŭhyŏp An Chunggŭn [The most righteous hero in Asia, An 
Chunggŭn]. Vol. 3. Seoul: Kukka Pohunch’ŏ. 
Han  56 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 17 (December 2015) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-17) 
 
Lee, Leo Ou-fan. 1999. Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 
1930–1945. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Liu Jianhui [Ryū Kenki]. 2000. Mato Shanhai: Nihon chishikijin no kindai taiken [Demon city, 
Shanghai: Japanese intellectuals’ experience of modernity].  Tokyo: Kōdansha. 
Liu jiaxun and Xu Diaoxi. 1931. Wanbaoshan Shijian ji Chaoxian Can’an [The Wanbaoshan 
Incident and massacre in Korea]. Shanghai: Riben Yanjiuhui. 
Liu, Lydia. 1995. Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated 
Modernity, 1900–1937. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Lü Bo. 1925. “An Chonggen yishi” [Anecdote of An Chunggŭn]. Guowen Zhoubao 2 (40): 17. 
Matsumoto Masumi. 1999. Chūgoku Minzoku Seisaku no Kenkyū: Shinmatsu kara 1945-nen 
made no “minzokuron” o chūshin ni [Chinese policies vis-à-vis ethnic groups: From the 
late Qing to 1945]. Tokyo: Taga Shuppan. 
McGrath, Jason. 2013. “Acting Real: Cinema, Stage, and the Modernity of Performance in 
Chinese Silent Film.” In The Oxford Handbook of Chinese Cinemas, edited by Carlos 
Rojas and Eileen Chow, 401–420. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mōri Kazuko. 1998. Shūen kara no Chūgoku: minzoku mondai to kokka [A yiew of China from 
the margins: The ethnic group issue and the nation]. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. 
Nakano Yasuo. 1984. An Jūkon: Nikkan kankei no genzō [An Chunggŭn: Primary figure of 
Japan-Korea relations]. Tokyo: Aki Shobō. 
———. 1996. An Jūkon to Itō Hirobumi [An Chunggŭn and Itō Hirobumi]. Tokyo: Kōbunsha.   
Pak, Boris. 2009. Haŏlbin yŏk ŭi pobok [Revenge at Harbin Station]. Translated by Sin Unyong 
and Yi Pyŏngjo. Seoul: Ch’aeryun. 
Pickowicz, Paul. 2012. China on Film: A Century of Exploration, Confrontation, and 
Controversy. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.  
Rausch, Franklin. 2012. “Visions of Violence, Dreams of Peace: Religious, Race, and Nation in 
An Chunggŭn’s A Treatise on Peace in the East.” Acta Koreana 15 (2): 263–291. 
Rojas, Carlos, and Eileen Chow, ed. 2013. The Oxford Handbook of Chinese Cinemas. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Schmid, Andre. 2002. Korea between Empires, 1895–1919. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Shih, Shu-mei. 2001. The Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Semicolonial China, 1917–
1937. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Sin Unyong, ed. 2009. An Chunggŭn kwa kŭ ŭi Sidae [An Chunggŭn and his times]. Seoul: 
Kyŏng’in Munhwasa. 
———. 2010. “An Chunggŭn ŭikŏ kwallyŏn ‘nokuk kwanhŏn ch’uicho pŏn’yŏkmun’ ŭi 
naeyong kwa ŭimi”[Analysis of the Russian interrogation record of An Chunggŭn]. In An 
Chung-gŭn kwa Tongyang p'yŏnghwaron [An Chunggŭn and A Treatise on Peace in the 
East], edited by An Chunggŭn Ŭisa Kinyŏm Saŏphoe, 275–301. Seoul: Ch’aeryun. 
Sin Unyong, ed. and trans. 2014. An Chunggŭn sinmun kirok [Interrogation record of An 
Chunggŭn]. Vols. 1–11. Seoul: Ch’aeryun. 
Sin Yongha, ed. 1995. An Chung-gŭn Yukochip [Posthumous work of An Chunggŭn]. Seoul: 
Yŏkminsa. 
Sumbirtseva (Сuмбирцева), T. M. 2010. “Russia ŭi An Chunggŭn Insik” [Russian perception of 
An Chunggŭn]. In An Chung-gŭn kwa Tongyang p'yŏnghwaron [An Chunggŭn and A 
Treatise on Peace in the East], edited by An Chunggŭn Ŭisa Kinyŏm Saŏphoe, 131–154. 
Seoul: Ch’aeryun.  
Han  57 
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 17 (December 2015) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-17) 
 
Tanaka, Stefan, 1993. Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Tikhonov, Vladimir. 2009. “Images of Russia and the Soviet Union in Modern Korea, 1880s–
1930s: An Overview.” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 22 (2): 215–247. 
Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. 1995. “Licensing Leisure: The Chinese Nationalists’ Attempts to 
Regulate Shanghai, 1927–1949.” The Journal of Asian Studies 54 (1): 19–42. 
Walker, Kathy. 1999. Chinese Modernity and the Peasant Path: Semicolonialism in the Northern 
Yangzi Delta. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Wang Chunxia. 2005. “Pai Man” yu minzu zhuyi [“Anti-Manchu” and nationalism]. Beijing: 
Shehui kexue wenxian. 
Yi Chŏng-hŭi. 2012. Chōsen Kakyō to kindai Higashi Ajia [Overseas Chinese in Korea and 
modern East Asia]. Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku Shuppankai. 
Yi Ŭnsang, trans. 1979. An Chunggŭn Ŭisa Chasŏchŏn [Autobiography of An Chunggŭn]. 
Seoul: An Chunggŭn Ŭisa Sungmohoe. 
Yi Yŏng-il. 1995. “1930 nyŏndae chŏnhu sanghae mangmyŏngpa yŏnghwa’yin dŭl ŭi chakpum 
hwaldong”[Korean film artists’ work in Shanghai around 1930] Yŏnghwa Yesul March: 
50–55; April and May: 50–58; June: 50–59. 
Yokoyama Hiroaki. 2009. Chūgoku no Iminzoku Shihai [China’s domination of other ethnic 
groups]. Tokyo: Shūeisha. 
Yonetani Masafumi. 2006. Ajia/ Nihon [Asia/Japan]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.  
Yoshizawa Seiichiro. 2003. Aikoku Shugi No Sōsei: Nashonarizumu kara kindai Chūgoku o miru 
[Formation of patriotism: Examining modern China from the issue of nationalism]. 
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. 
Yun Byŏngsŏk. 2011a. An Chunggŭn Yŏn’gu [Analysis of An Chunggŭn]. Seoul: Kukhak 
Charyowŏn. 
———. 2011b. An Chunggŭn Chŏn’gi [Biography of An Chunggŭn]. Seoul: Kukhak 
Charyowŏn. 
Zhang, Yingjin, ed. 1999. Cinema and Urban Culture in Shanghai, 1922–1943. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
———. 2003. “Industry and Ideology: A Centennial Review of Chinese cinema.” World 
Literature Today 77 (3): 8–13. 
Zhang, Zhen. 2005. An Amorous History of the Silver Screen: Shanghai Cinema, 1896–1937. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago. 
Zheng Peiwei and Guiqing Liu, eds. 1996. Zhongguo Wusheng Dianying Juben [Script collection 
of Chinese silent film]. Vol. 2. Beijing: Zhongguo Dianying Chubanshe. 
Zhongguo guomindang xuanchuanbu. 1931. Wanbaoshan shijian ji Chaoxian paihua can’an 
[The Wanbaoshan Incident and anti-Chinese massacre in Korea]. Nanjing: Zhongguo 
guomin dang xuanchuanbu. 
 
